000			01530naa a2200181uu 4500
001			11745
003			OSt
005			20190211155626.0
008			030312s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBROOKS, Arthur _91494
245	1	0	_aPublic subsidies and charitable giving : _bcrowding out, crowding in, or both?
260			_c2000
520	3		_aWhether government subsidies to nonprofit organizations leverage (crowd in) private donations, or rather crowd them out has been actively debated for some time. A third hypothesis , explored theoretically and tested empirically in this paper, is that the two phenomena are actually not inconsistent with one another: at low levels of subsidies, government support may stimulate private giving, whereas at high levels it could have just the opposite effect. The model presented is based on this idea, which yields implications relevant to nonprofit management and public policy, and tests it with data on symphony orchestras. The conclusions is that the maximization of private donations and total "unearned"revenue are not compatible goals. Further, nonprofits that suffer form short-term liquidity problems or managerial shortsightedeness may face a "subsidy trap", in which they are forced to rely on suboptimal levels of subsidies in terms of maximizing the firms`s revenues
773	0	8	_tJournal of Policy Analysis and Management _g19, 3, p. 451-464 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030312 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060331 _b1635^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c11868 _d11868
041			_aeng