000			01716naa a2200181uu 4500
001			11824
003			OSt
005			20190211155645.0
008			030331s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aHELMKE, Gretchen _94724
245	1	0	_aThe logic of strategic defection : _bcourt-executive relations in Argentina under dictatorship and democracy
260			_bAmerican Political Science Association, _c2002
520	3		_aBuilding on the separation-of-powers approach in american politics, this article develops a new micro-level account of judicial decision-making in contexts where judges face institutional insecurity. Against conventional wisdom, I argue that under certain conditions the lack of judicial independence motivates judges to strategically defect against the government once it begins losing power. The result is a reverse legal-political cycle in which antigovernment decisions cluster at the end of weak governments. Original data on more than 7.500 individual decisions by Argentine Supreme Court justices (1976-1995) are used to test hypotheses about why, when, and in which types of cases judges are likely to engage in stretegic defection. Consistent with the theory`s prediction, the results of the analysis show a significant increase in antigovernment decisions occurring at the end of weak dictatorships and weak democratic governments. Examining subsets of decisions and controlling for several additional variables further corroborate the strategic account
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g96, 2, p. 291-303 _dAmerican Political Science Association, 2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030331 _bKaren _cKaren
998			_a20060403 _b1654^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c11947 _d11947
041			_aeng