000			01627naa a2200193uu 4500
001			11843
003			OSt
005			20190211155651.0
008			030408s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSTROM, Kaare _910409
245	1	0	_aStrategic parliamentary dissolution
260			_bAmerican Political Science Association, _c2002
520	3		_aAn important agenda power in parliamentary democracies is the discretion over the dissolution of parliament. We argue that variation in constitutional rules and the political environment will systematically affect the frequency of early elections. We hypothesize that dissolution will be more frequent under single-party governments, when the head of state plays an insignificant role, when neither parliament nor the cabinet can inhibit dissolution, when minority governments are in power, when the head of state can dissolve unilaterally, and later in the constitutional term. using standard logistic and cox-proportional hazard techniques, we test these expectations in a pooled time-series setting against observations of most OECD parliamentary democracies for the years 1960-1995. We find that parliamentary dissolutions are more frequent earlier in the constitutional term, under minority governments, when the head of state plays an insignificant role, and when the parliament or the cabinet in not involved
700	1		_aSWINDLE, Stephen M _920439
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g96, 3, p. 575-591 _dAmerican Political Science Association, 2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030408 _bKaren _cKaren
998			_a20060404 _b1119^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c11966 _d11966
041			_aeng