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_aLUSTICK, Ian S; MIODOWNIK, Dan; EIDELSON, Roy J _921360 |
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_aSecessionism in multicultural states : _bdoes sharing power prevent or encourage it? |
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_aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cMay 2004 |
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520 | 3 | _aInstitutional frameworks powerfully determine the goals, violence, and trajectories of identitarian movements - including secessionist movements. However, both small-N and large-N researchers disagree on the question of whether "power-sharing" arrangements, instead to repression, are more or less likely to mitigate threats of secessionist mobilizations by disaffected, regionally concentrated minority groups. The PS-I modeling plataform was used to create a virtual country "Beita," containing within it a disaffected, partially controlled, regionally concentrated minority. Drawing on constructivist indentity theory to determine behaviors by individual agents in Beita, the most popular theorical positions on this issue were tested. Data were, drawn from batches of hundreds of Beita histories produced under rigorous experimental conditions. The results lend support to sophisticated interpretations of the effects of repression vs. responsive or representative types of power-sharing. Although in the short run repression works to suppress ethnopolitical mobilization, it does not effectively reduce the threat os secession. Power-sharing can be more effective, but it also tends to encourage larger minority identitarian movements. | |
773 | 0 | 8 |
_tAmerican Political Science Review _g98, 2, p. 209-230 _dNew York : Cambridge University Press, May 2004 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w |
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_a20050614 _b1423^b _cTiago |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13245 _d13245 |
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041 | _aeng |