000			01490naa a2200169uu 4500
001			5061414453810
003			OSt
005			20190211160002.0
008			050614s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aPOWELL, Robert _921361
245	1	0	_aThe Inefficient use of power : _bcostly conflict with complete information
260			_aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cMay 2004
520	3		_aRecent work across a wide range of issues in political economy as well as in American, comparative, and international politics tries to explain the inefficient use of power - revolutions, civil wars, high levels of public debt, international conflictm and costly policy insulation - in terms of commitment problems. This paper shows that a common mechanism is at work in a number of these diverse studies. This common mechanism provides a more general formulation of a type of commitment problem that can arise in many different substantive settings. The present analysis the formalizes this mechanism as an "inefficiency condition" that ensures that all of the equilibria of a stochastic game are inefficient. This condition has a natural substative interpretation: Large, rapid changes in the actor´s relative powe (measured in terms of their minmax payoffs) may cause inefficiency
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g98, 2, p. 231-242 _dNew York : Cambridge University Press, May 2004 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20050614 _b1445^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13246 _d13246
041			_aeng