000			01941naa a2200169uu 4500
001			5061415232710
003			OSt
005			20190211160002.0
008			050614s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBASINGER, Scott J.; HALLERBERG, Mark _921362
245	1	0	_aRemodeling the competition for capital : _bhow domestic politics erases the race to the bottom
260			_aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cMay 2004
520	3		_aThis paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital, using the analogy of a "tournament" as a substitute for the "race-to-the-bottom" model. Our key insight is that political costs that accompany legislating have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood and scale of reforms. While coutries with higher political costs are less likely themselves to enact reforms, the presence of these costs also reduces competing countries' incentives to reform regardlless of their own political costs. Domestic politics therefore mitigates the pressures for downward convergence of tax policy despite increased capital mobility. We examine the capital tax policies in OECD countries during the period from 1980 to 1997 and find that states are sensitive to tax reforms in competitor countries, although their responses to reforms are mediated by theyr own domestic costs to reform. We define two potential sources of political costs of reform: transaction costs, due to presence of multiple veto players in the legislative process, abd constituency costs, due to ideological opposition to policu changes that benefit capital. Our evidence reveals that a reduction in these costs either domestically or abroad increases the likelihood that a country enacts tax reforms.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g98, 2, p. 261-276 _dNew York : Cambridge University Press, May 2004 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20050614 _b1523^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13248 _d13248
041			_aeng