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100	1		_aSHIPAN, Charles R _921298
245	1	0	_aRegulatory regimes, agency actions, and the conditional nature of congressional influence
260			_aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cAugust 2004
520	3		_aPolitical bureaucracies make the overwhelming majority of public policy decisions in the United States. To examine the extent to wich these agency actions are responsive to the preferences of elected officials, in particular, Congress, I develop a spatial model of oversight. The most important insight of this theory is that agencies make policy decisions within given regimes and may be constrained by the preferences of different political actors at different times. To test the theory, I collect and analyze data on the monitoring activities of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). I find that under certain conditions, the FDA is responsive to the preferences of committees and floors in Congress, but under other conditions the agency can act autonomously.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g98, 3, p. 467-480 _dNew York : Cambridge University Press, August 2004 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20050615 _b1621^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13268 _d13268
041			_aeng