000			01417naa a2200169uu 4500
001			5061516545910
003			OSt
005			20190211160007.0
008			050615s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aHUBER, John D; McCARTY, Nolan _921377
245	1	0	_aBureaucratic capacity, delegation, and political reform
260			_aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cAugust 2004
520	3		_aWe analyze a model of delegation and policymacking in polities where bureaucratic capacity is low. Our analysis suggests that low bureaucratic capacity diminishes incentives for bureaucrats to comply with legislation, making it more difficult for politicians to induce bureaucrats to take actions that politicians desire. Consequently, when bureaucratic capacity is low, standard principles in the theoretical literature on delegation no longer hold. We also use the model to examine the issue of political reform in polities with low bureaucratic capacity. The model indicates that politicians in such polities will be trapped in a situation whereby they have little incentive to undertake reforms of either the bureaucracy or other institutions (such as courts) that are crucial for sucessful policymaking.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g98, 3, p. 481-494 _dNew York : Cambridge University Press, August 2004 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20050615 _b1654^b _cTiago
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13269 _d13269
041			_aeng