000			03154nam a2200337uu 4500
001			506241647058
003			OSt
005			20190211160025.0
008			050624s1993 xx ||||g| |0|| 0 eng d
020			_a0521428319
090			_a6.02 _bB2617p
245	1	0	_aPolitical economy: institutions, competition, and representation : _bproceedings of the seventh international symposium in economic theory and econometrics
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge University, _c1993
300			_a522 p.
490	0		_aInternational symposia in economic theory and econometrics
500			_aInclui bibliografia
505	8	0	_tPolitical economy: a personal interpretation and an overview - Norman J. Schofield _t1. Perspectives on political economy _t - Political ideology, communication, and community - Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger _t - Implementation and enforcement in institutional modeling - Leonid Hurwicz _t - Toward a theory of institutional change - Douglass C. North _t - The development of contemporary political theory - Peter C. Ordeshook _t2. Representation and voting _t - Proportional representation, approval voting, and coalitionally straightforward elections - Roger B. Myerson _t - Party competition in a spatial model of coalition formation - Norman J. Schofield _t - Some foundations for empirical study in the Euclidean spatial model of social choice - Craig A. Tovey _t3. Political Institutions _t - Communication in institutions: efficiency in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with hidden information - Randall L. Calvert _t - The courts and slavery in the United States: Property rights and credible commitment -John N. Drobak _t - On the pervasiveness of sophisticated sincerity - Tim Groseclose and Keith Krehbiel _t - Initial versus continuing proposal power in legislative seniority systems - Richard D. McKelvey and Raymond Riezman _t4. Political Competition _t - Adverse selection and moral hazard in a repeated elections model - Jeffrey S. Banks and Rangarajan K. Sundaram _t - Campaign contributions and party-candidate competition in services and policies - David P. Baron and Jongryn Mo _t - Polarization, incumbency, and the personal vote - John Londregan and Thomas Romer _t - Credibility and the responsiveness of direct legislation - Arthur Lupia _t5. Information acquisition by government _t - Information acquisition and orthogonal argument - David Austen-Smith _t - A welfare analysis of political action - Susanne Lohmann _t6. Government behavior _t - Monetary policy and credibility under exact monetary aggregation - William A. Barnett _t - A general equilibrium model with endogenous government behavior - Eric Drissen and Frans van Winden _t
650		4	_aTeoria Econômica _911924
650		4	_aTeoria Política _912117
650		4	_aIdeologia Política _912043
650		4	_aEleição _915646
650		4	_aPolítica Monetária _912053
651		4	_aEstados Unidos _912942
700	1		_a _921406
700	1		_a _921407
942			_cG
998			_a20050624 _b1647^b _cIsabel
998			_a20140814 _b0936^b _ckarina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13309 _d13309
041			_aeng