000			01715naa a2200181uu 4500
001			5082616070617
003			OSt
005			20190211160056.0
008			050826s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGILARDI, Fabrizio _94086
245	1	0	_aThe institutional foundations of regulatory capitalism : _bthe diffusion of independent regulatory agencies in western europe
260			_aThousand Oaks : _bSAGE, _cMarch 2005
520	3		_aThis article studies the difusion of the main institucional feature of regulatory capitalism, namely, independent regulatory agencies. While only few such authorities existed in Europe in the early 1980s, by the end of the twentieth century they had spread impressively across countries and sectors. The analysis finds that tree classes of factors (bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal) explain this trend. First, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies was an attempt to improve credible commitment capacity when liberalizing and privatizing utilities and to alleviate the political uncertainty problem, namely, the risk to a government that its policies will be changed when it loses power. Second, Europeanization favored the creation of independent regulators. Third, individual decisions were interdependent, as governments were influenced by the decisions of others in an emulation process where the symbolic properties of independent regulators mattered mre than the functions they performed
773	0	8	_tThe Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science _g598, p. 84-101 _dThousand Oaks : SAGE, March 2005 _xISSN 00027162 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20050826 _b1607^b _cAnaluiza
998			_a20100803 _b1032^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13432 _d13432
041			_aeng