000			01989naa a2200181uu 4500
001			5082617111917
003			OSt
005			20190211160056.0
008			050826s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWAY, Christopher R _916625
245	1	0	_aPolitical insecurity and the diffusion of financial market regulation
260			_aThousand Oaks : _bSAGE, _cMarch 2005
520	3		_aExplanations for the international apread of financial market liberalization have emphasized either "topdown" mechanisms (globalization, pressure from international organizations and the United States) or "botm-up" mechanisms focusing on domestic coalitions (derived from configurations of economic interests). In contrast to these broadly structural approaches that deemphasize the coices of individuals, this article focuses on the incentives facing office-mechanisms of diffusion by emphasizing the incentives facing office-seeeking leaders. It argues that politically insecure leaders are potent agents of diffusion because they are particulary likely to "learn" the lessons of financial market reform an emulate the liberalizing practices of others for two reasons. First, the hefty economic boom often associated with financial liberalization provides a tempting way to buttress their near-term grip on power. As they observe other nations in their region experiencing a boom, leaders fearful of losing office will jump on the liberalization bandwagon, accelerating regional reform cascades. Second, insecure governments may be particularly susceptible to pressure from international organizations: They have motivated biases to bellieve the efficiency claims of liberalizers and strong reasons to seek approval for their policies.
773	0	8	_tThe Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science _g598, p. 125-144 _dThousand Oaks : SAGE, March 2005 _xISSN 00027162 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20050826 _b1711^b _cAnaluiza
998			_a20100803 _b1033^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13434 _d13434
041			_aeng