000			01319naa a2200169uu 4500
001			5092915434017
003			OSt
005			20190211160149.0
008			050929s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKWON, Hyeok Yong _921940
245	1	0	_aTargeting Public Spending in a New Democracy : _bevidence from South Korea
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _cApril 2005
520	3		_aEmpirical studies of electoral competition and public policy in new democracies have been relatively underdeveloped. This article investigates the election-policy outcome link in a 'hard case' setting. South Korea in 1988-97. Contrary to expectations derived from the bureaucratic insulation or fiscal co-ordination argument, this study suggests a systematic impact of electoral competition on levels and distributive patterns of public spending. The analysis finds that levels of government expenditure increased according to the electoral competitive. The results of the analysis clearly show that fiscal policies in democratizing korea are to a significant extent determined by electoral politics
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g35, 2, p. 321-341 _dCambridge : Cambridge University Press, April 2005 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20050929 _b1543^b _cAnaluiza
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13699 _d13699
041			_aeng