000			01746naa a2200181uu 4500
001			5092917510417
003			OSt
005			20190211160151.0
008			050929s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGELMAN, Andrew; KATZ, Jonathan N.; BAFUMI, Joseph _921946
245	1	0	_aStandard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work : _ban empirical analysis
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _cOctober 2004
520	3		_aVoting power indexes such as that of Banzhaf are derived, explicity or implicity, from the assumption that all votes are equally likely (i.e., random voting). That assumption implies that the probability of a vote being decisive in a jurisdiction with n voteres is proportional to 1/n. In this article the authors show how this hypothesis has been empirically tested and rejected using data from various US and European elections. They find that the probability proportional to 1/n. The random voting model (and, more generally, the square-root rule) overestimates the probability of close elections in larger jurisdictions. As a result, classical voting power indexes make voters in large jurisdictions appear more powerful than they really are. The most important political implication of their result is that proportionally weighted voting systems (that is, each jurisdiction gets a number of votes proportional to n) are basically fair. This contradicts the claim in the voting power literature that weights should be aproximately proportional to n
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g34, 4, p. 657-674 _dCambridge : Cambridge University Press, October 2004 _xISSN 007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20050929 _b1751^b _cAnaluiza
998			_a20050930 _b1549^b _cAnaluiza
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13708 _d13708
041			_aeng