000			01521naa a2200169uu 4500
001			5093016384717
003			OSt
005			20220419155645.0
008			050930s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_921948 _aLewis, David E., _d1970-
245	1	0	_aThe Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _cJuly 2004
520	3		_aThe US Congress has often sought to limit presidential influence over certain public policies by designing agencies that are insulated from presidential control. Wheter or not insulated agencies persist over time has important consequences for presidential management. If those agencies that persist over time are also those that are the most immune from presidential direction, this has potentially fall consequences for the president's ability to manage the executive branch. Modern presidents will preside over a less and less manageable bureaucracy over time. This article explains why agencies insulated from presidential control are more durable than other agencies and shows that they have a significantly higher expected duration than other agencies. The conclusion is that modern American presidents preside over a bureaucracy that is insulated from their control
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g34, 3, p. 377-404 _dCambridge : Cambridge University Press, July 2004 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20050930 _b1638^b _cAnaluiza
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13714 _d13714
041			_aeng