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100 | 1 |
_aMASON, Andrew _921965 |
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245 | 1 | 0 | _aJust Contraints |
260 |
_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _cApril 2004 |
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520 | 3 | _aPolitical theorists disagree about the extent to wich issues of feasibility, stability, institutional design and human can be bracketed in analysing the concept of justice. At one end spectrum some argue that no analysis of justice can be adequate in the abssence of an account of hw it could be implemented, whereas at the other end there are those who argue that principles of justice are logically independent of issues of feasibility. Influenced by the work of John Rawls, many theorists occupy the middle ground, maintaining that analyses of justice must be realistic, that is, realezable under the best of foreseeable conditions. Against rawls and others, this article argues that feasibility does not constrain what can count as an adequate principle f justice but nevertheless maintains that there are limits on such principles that derive in part from human nature, which divergent theories of justice must respect. It also distinguishes between different levels of analysis, some of which are governed by feasibility constraints | |
773 | 0 | 8 |
_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g34, 2, p. 251-268 _dCambridge : Cambridge University Press, April 2004 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w |
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_a20051003 _b1710^b _cAnaluiza |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13729 _d13729 |
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041 | _aeng |