000			01857naa a2200181uu 4500
001			5100318174417
003			OSt
005			20190211160157.0
008			051003s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGERRING, John; THACKER, Strom C _921966
245	1	0	_aPolitical Institutions and Corruption : _bthe role of unitarism and parliamentarism
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _cApril 2004
520	3		_aA raft of new research on the causes and effects of political corruption has emerged in recent years, in tandem with a separate, growing focus on the effects of political institutions on important outcomes such as economic growth, social equality and political stability. Yet we know little about the possible role of different political corruption. This article examines the impact of territorial sovereignty (unitary or federal) and the composition of the executive (parliamentary or presidential) on levels of perceived political corruption cross-nationally. We find that unitary and parliamentary forms of government help reduce levels of corruption. To explain this result, we explore a series of seven potential causal mechanisms that emerge out the competing centralist and decentralist theoretical paradigms: (1) openess, transparency and information costs, (2) intergovernmental competition, (3) localism, (4) party competition, (5) decision rules, (6) collective action problems, and (7) public administration. Our empirical findings and our analysis of causal mechanisms suggest that centralized constitutions help foster lower levels of political corruption
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Poitical Science _g34, 2, p. 295-330 _dCambridge : Cambridge University Press, April 2004 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20051003 _b1817^b _cAnaluiza
998			_a20051004 _b1358^b _cAnaluiza
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13731 _d13731
041			_aeng