000			01583naa a2200169uu 4500
001			5100516573017
003			OSt
005			20190211160203.0
008			051005s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBRAUNINGER, Thomas _921982
245	1	0	_aWhen Simple Voting Doesn't Work : _bmulticameral systems for the representation and aggregation of interests in international organizations
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _cOctober 2003
520	3		_aThis article analyses the origins and consequences of multicameral representation and voting in international organizations. It is argued that the existence of visible and durable conflicts in an area can make standard procedures such as unicameral majority voting ineffective with respect to the functioning of the regime. Applying spatial models of strategic decision making, it is asserted that multicameralism is more likely to be effective than unicameralism if chambers consist of key groups with distinct interests. Empirical evidence is provided by studying the multicameral voting rule in the Council of the International Seabed Authority (ISA). I compare likely decision-making outcomes under unicameral voting rules from 1996 to 2002 and find that multicameral outcomes are more likely to be stable and supported by those actors critical for the effective functioning of the regime
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g33, 4, p. 681-703 _dCambridge : Cambridge University Press, October 2003 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20051005 _b1657^b _cAnaluiza
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13749 _d13749
041			_aeng