000			01784nam a2200217uu 4500
001			1206
003			OSt
005			20190211154039.0
008			001019s1997 xx ||||g| |0|| 0 eng d
090			_a6.02 _bF525f
245	1	0	_aFirms, markets and contracts : _bcontributions to neoinstitutional economics
260			_aNew York : _bPhysica-Verlag Heidelberg, _c1997
300			_a298 p.
505	8	0	_tDebt as an option to own in the theory of ownership rights _tAsymetric information and the horizontal integration of firms _tShort-Terminism and the market for corporate control _tThe influence of transaction costs in labor markets on the organization of industry - A comparative analysis of japanese industrial organization _tInformation rent and technology choice ia a regulated firm _tConstitutional contracting and corporate constitution _tCollusion and budget distortions in hierarchical organizations _tLong-term franchise contracts: a closer look at the hold-up problem _tThe risk incentive problem, and repeated investment opportunities _tFinancial contracting with adverse selection and moral _tOn the rationality of kidnaps, blackguards, and hostages _tInformation problems in the market for medical services _tData envelopment analysis: a basis for incentive contracting _tEnvironmental problems from a property rights perspectives _tEfficient allocation of an indivisible good: a mechanism design problem under uncertainty _tRisk sharing markets and export production _tSlot allocation in the United States. A transaction cost economic analysis
650		4	_aTeoria Econômica _911924
700	1		_a _913637
942			_cG
998			_a20001019 _bMaria _cMaria do Carmo Raphael
998			_a20160803 _b1012^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c1395 _d1395
041			_aeng