000			01698naa a2200169uu 4500
001			5110417503017
003			OSt
005			20190211160211.0
008			051104s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMcKAY, David _922312
245	1	0	_aThe Political Sustainability of European Monetary Union
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge Universtity Press, _cJuly 1999
520	3		_aThis article synthesizes a large body of work in applied economics on the likely effects of European Monetary Union with an established literature in political science on the political sustainability of intervention by central or federal authorities in the economies of diverse nations, states or regions. Three possible economic scenario resulting from EMU are identified - fiscal centralization, monetary discipline and loose money. the greatly enhanced central role implied by the first two wolud be difficult to legitimize in the context of the absence of a European citizen identity or party system. Historical precedent suggests that, in democracies, both central redistribution in social spending and retrenchment of established social programmes are facilitated by jurisdiction-wide political parties. The loose money scenario, while viable in most member states, would be unlikely to be acceptable in Germany. The article concludes, therefore, that all three scenarios most often predicted by the economics literature carry with them a risk that they will be difficult to sustain politically
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g29, 2, p. 463-485 _dCambridge : Cambridge Universtity Press, July 1999 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20051104 _b1750^b _cAnaluiza
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c13990 _d13990
041			_aeng