000			01544naa a2200169uu 4500
001			5110817361517
003			OSt
005			20190211160215.0
008			051108s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMENDUS, Susan _922340
245	1	0	_aThe Importance of Love in Rawls's Theory of Justice
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _cJanuary 1999
520	3		_aIn Part III of A Theory of Justice John Rawls asks whether we can show that the disposition to act justly is congruent with the good of the agent who cultivates it. His answer to the problem of congruence has been widely criticized, and Rawls himself now seems to think that this parts of A Theory of Justice is defective because the Kantian interpretation implies a comprehensive conception of the good. This article questions that conclusion, and aims to show how the analogy between love and justice can be developoed in a way which ensures congruence without implying comprehensiveness. The case of love provides a sense in which our good is neither a function of immediate desires, nor something entirely independent of desire. By showing how congruence is possible it answers the motivational question which lies at the heart of Part III and also promises a richer understanding of what is involved in cultivating the disposition to justice
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g29, 1, p. 57-75 _dCambridge : Cambridge University Press, January 1999 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20051108 _b1736^b _cAnaluiza
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c14009 _d14009
041			_aeng