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100 1 _aBEODTRICK, Otto
_922370
245 1 0 _aHow does an auditor general´s office see itself?
260 _aToronto :
_bIPAC,
_cSummer 2004
520 3 _aAuditors general are guided by legislative mandates that specify duties and protocols but rarely the underlying purpose of auditing. When asked about their purpose, auditors typically mention the need for satisfying the accountability requirement, but the interpretation of this requirement varies: is it to root out fraud, waste and abuse; to act as a deterrent against mismanagement by assigning blame for wrongdoing; to simply measure and report the performance of government programs; or to help improve program performance? Auditors general have no executive power outside their office, but, because of their status, they can significantly influence executives. Yet, that status is based on a paradox, namely on the level of disagreement between political overseers of programs and program managers. When there is no disagreement about a program’s function and performance, there is little for the auditor to do. When there is a high level of disagreement, the auditor’s work becomes important because his or her opinion counts, and his or her status rises accordingly. An auditor general’s office’s self-image – and of the role of government – informs auditors’ values and their approaches to their work. The office’s leadership can make these self-images visible and influence them. The article concludes with a section on the audit offices’ accountability and suggests making auditors accountable for the learning, as a result of their work, that takes place in the audited organizations
773 0 8 _tCanadian Public Administration : the journal of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada
_g47, 2, p. 225-242
_dToronto : IPAC, Summer 2004
_xISSN 008-4840
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20051110
_b1114^b
_cTiago
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c14043
_d14043
041 _aeng