000			01812naa a2200169uu 4500
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003			OSt
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008			051111s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWARD, Hugh _922397
245	1	0	_aA Game Theoretic Analysis of the Politics of Taking It in Turns
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _cApril 1998
520	3		_aTaking in turns is an endemic feature of political and social life. For instance, in a democratic system parties take turns in office according to the outcome of elections. Despite its empirical importance, taking it in turns has received virtually no attention from rational choice theorists. First, a general definition of taking it in turns is given. Secondly, the conditions for taking it in turns to be stable and efficient in Prisioners' Dilemma, Chicken, and Co-ordination supergames are discussed. The key result is that, where stable adherence of others, players will stick with the pattern if they get their turn often enough. The precise conditions are shown to depend on the payoff structure and the discount rate. Potential problems are identified with initiating stable taking it in turn because of the existence of multiple equilibria and players' desire to get a table taking it in turns pattern that gives them a high expected payoff. The paradigmaic version of this problem is who goes first when two players alternate between getting a high and a low payoff. The applicability of the results is illustrated by considering the questions of democratic stability and transitions to democracy
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g28, 2, p. 355-387 _dCambridge : Cambridge University Press, April 1998 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20051111 _b1652^b _cAnaluiza
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c14078 _d14078
041			_aeng