000			01871naa a2200169uu 4500
001			5111410025117
003			OSt
005			20190211160236.0
008			051114s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aIVERSEN, Torben _95092
245	1	0	_aWage Bargaining, Hard Money and Economic Performance : _btheory and evidence for organized market economies
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _cJanuary 1998
520	3		_aThe political and economic couplings between wage bargaining institutions and macro-economic policy regimes are explored in this article. It is argued that in advanced industrialized democracies with well-organized unions and employers' associations, macro-economic performance (especially unemployment) is the outcome of an interaction between the centralization of the wage bargaining system and the monetary policy regima. Thus, a decentralized gargaining system in which the government is credicly commited to a non-accommodating monetary policy rule poses an institutional alternative to a centralized mode of wage regulation where thw government anjoys macro-economic policy flexibility. Based on time-series data from ten highly organized market economies, I show that both of these institutional 'equilibria' produce superior employment performance, but also that the two systems are associated with very different distributional outcomes, and that they are supported by different coalitions of organized interests. In addition to predicting economic outcomes, the proposed model provides a theoretical framework for analysing institutional change in wage bargaind systems and in macro-economic policy regimes
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g28, 1, p. 31-61 _dCambridge : Cambridge University Press, January 1998 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20051114 _b1002^b _cAnaluiza
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c14081 _d14081
041			_aeng