| 000 | 01694naa a2200205uu 4500 | ||
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| 001 | 6032314514521 | ||
| 003 | OSt | ||
| 005 | 20190211160737.0 | ||
| 008 | 060323s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aSIEBART, Patricia _923675 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aCorporate governance of nonprofit organizations : _bcooperation and control |
| 260 |
_aPhiladelphia : _bRoutledge, _c2005 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aThis article explores the limits of institutional economics regarding the cooperation of boards of directors and executive directors of nonprofit organizations. The normative separation of power between these central actors resulting especially from arguments derived from institutional economics is being reflected using the analytical approach from the resource-based view and empirical evidence based upon group and motivational theory. After analyzing the boards role and the individual board members role within a nonprofit organization, the paper explores the limits to decision-making within governing bodies. The paper shows why a unitary board can improve the quality of decision-making within nonprofit organizations by raising the incentives for the executive director to act as desired. The paper also explores the impact of trust and different types of control upon the key actors within the governance process in order to derive the suitable form of control from that analysis. | |
| 590 | _aVolume 28 | ||
| 590 | _aNumber 9-10 | ||
| 773 | 0 | 8 |
_tInternational Journal of Public Administration - IJPA _g28, 9-10, p. 857 - 867 _dPhiladelphia : Routledge, 2005 _xISSN 01900692 _w |
| 942 | _cS | ||
| 998 |
_a20060323 _b1451^b _cNatália |
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| 998 |
_a20100723 _b1002^b _cDaiane |
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| 999 |
_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c15101 _d15101 |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||