000			01943naa a2200265uu 4500
001			6032716063021
003			OSt
005			20190211160825.0
008			060327s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aPERMANAND, Govin _923910
245	1	0	_aConstitutional asymmetry and pharmaceutical policy-making in the European Union
260			_aPhiladelphia, PA : _bRoutledge, _c2005
520	3		_aThis paper offers a theoretical perspective on pharmaceutical policy-making in the European Union, and shows the lack of a single European market in medicines to be the result of a clash between the supranational free movement rules and national healthcare policy competencies. The paper considers the roles of the European Commission, the member states, the industry and consumer interests (patients) as the main stakeholders, and frames the discussion within an integrated macro- and meso-level approach. Here we draw on Wilson's ‘politics of (regulatory) politics’ typology, tying it to Scharpf's ‘constitutional asymmetry’ perspective on EU policy. This enables the development of a broad sphere of analysis, allowing us to make observations on the EU regulatory arrangement for medicines as a whole. Specifically, the paper shows the extent to which industrial rather than health(care) policy interests have driven the development of regulatory policy in the sector, and seeks to understand the political dynamics shaping the on-going evolution of the regulatory framework.
650		4	_aConstitutional asymmetry _923911
650		4	_aEuropean Union _917114
650		4	_aPharmaceuticals _918723
650		4	_aPolicy-making _917297
650		4	_aRegulation _916541
650		4	_aSingle market _917261
700	1		_aMOSSIALOS, Elias _923912
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g12, 4, p. 687 - 709 _dPhiladelphia, PA : Routledge, 2005 _xISSN 1350-1763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20060327 _b1606^b _cNatália
998			_a20100623 _b1242^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c15223 _d15223
041			_aeng