000			01736naa a2200181uu 4500
001			6033114460321
003			OSt
005			20190211160925.0
008			060331s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aLONSDALE, Chris _924166
245	1	0	_aPost-Contractual Lock-in and the UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) : _bthe Cases of National Savings and Investments and the Lord Chancellor's Department
260			_aCanberra, Australia : _bBlackwell publishing, _cMarch 2005
520	3		_aAccording to the UK government, one of the key features of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is the scope it provides to transfer risk to private sector suppliers. Under the PFI, public bodies are expected to develop interdependent relationships with suppliers that allow risk to be transferred. However, it is the argument of the author that it will not always be possible for interdependent relationships to be engineered by public bodies – on many occasions, public bodies will find themselves asymmetrically locked-in to their supplier. This situation leads to private sector suppliers becoming dominant in those relationships which, in turn, will allow them to pass back risk and obtain greater returns. As a result, the author argues that it is not a question of whether risk can be transferred under the PFI, but when. This argument is illustrated by use of the contracts managed by the UK National Savings and Investments and the UK Lord Chancellor's Department.
773	0	8	_tPublic Administration an International Quarterly _g83, 1, p. 67-88 _dCanberra, Australia : Blackwell publishing, March 2005 _xISSN 0033-3298 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20060331 _b1446^b _cNatália
998			_a20060403 _b0929^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c15376 _d15376
041			_aeng