000			01565naa a2200169uu 4500
001			6041116101221
003			OSt
005			20190211161008.0
008			060411s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKEDAR, Orit _924432
245	1	0	_aWhen Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties : _bPolicy Balancingin Parliamentary Elections
260			_aNew York, NY : _bAmerican Political Science Association, _cMay 2005
520	3		_aThis work develops and tests a theory of voter choice in parliamentary elections. I demonstrate that voters are concerned with policy outcomes and hence incorporate the way institutions convert votes to policy into their choices. Since policy is often the result of institutionalized multiparty bargaining and thus votes are watered down by power-sharing, voters often compensate for this watering-down by supporting parties whose positions differ from (and are often more extreme than) their own. I use this insight to reinterpret an ongoing debate between proximity and directional theories of voting, showing that voters prefer parties whose positions differ from their own views insofar as these parties pull policy in a desired direction. Utilizing data from four parliamentary democracies that vary in their institutional design, I test my theory and show how institutional context affects voter behavior.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g99, 2, p. 185-199 _dNew York, NY : American Political Science Association, May 2005 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20060411 _b1610^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c15530 _d15530
041			_aeng