000			01631naa a2200169uu 4500
001			6041309435521
003			OSt
005			20190211161011.0
008			060413s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSTOKES, Susan C. _924449
245	1	0	_aPerverse Accountability : _bA Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina
260			_aNew York, NY : _bAmerican Political Science Association, _cAugust 2005
520	3		_aPolitical machines (or clientelist parties) mobilize electoral support by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for their votes. But if the secret ballot hides voters' actions from the machine, voters are able to renege, accepting benefits and then voting as they choose. To explain how machine politics works, I observe that machines use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and infer individuals' votes. When parties influence how people vote by threatening to punish them for voting for another party, I call this accountability. I analyze the strategic interaction between machines and voters as an iterated prisoners' dilemma game with one-sided uncertainty. The game generates hypotheses about the impact of the machine's capacity to monitor voters, and of voters' incomes and ideological stances, on the effectiveness of machine politics. I test these hypotheses with data from Argentina.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g99, 3, p. 315-325 _dNew York, NY : American Political Science Association, August 2005 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20060413 _b0943^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c15545 _d15545
041			_aeng