000			01686naa a2200169uu 4500
001			6041310030321
003			OSt
005			20190211161014.0
008			060413s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aROSENDORFF, B.Peter _919473
245	1	0	_aStability and Rigidity : _bPolitics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure
260			_aNew York, NY : _bAmerican Political Science Association, _cAugust 2005
520	3		_aThe increased “legalization” embodied in the revised Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is shown to be an institutional innovation that increases the opportunities for states to temporarily suspend their obligations in periods of unexpected, but heightened, domestic political pressure for protection. This increased flexibility in the system reduces per-period cooperation among states but also reduces the possibility that the regime may break down entirely. There is shown to be a trade-off between rigidity and stability in international institutional design in the face of unforeseen, but occasionally intense, domestic political pressure. In a model with a WTO that serves both an informational and adjudicatory role, it is established that agreements with DSPs are self-enforcing, are more stable, and are more acceptable to a wider variety of countries than agreements without DSPs. Evidence drawn from data on preferential trading agreements supports the key hypotheses.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g99, 3, p. 389-400 _dNew York, NY : American Political Science Association, August 2005 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20060413 _b1003^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c15551 _d15551
041			_aeng