000			03726nam a2200229uu 4500
001			1375
003			OSt
005			20190211154045.0
008			001020s1996 xx ||||g| |0|| 0 eng d
090			_a6.02 _bV4225e
100	1		_aVEGA-REDONDO, Fernando _910937
245	1	0	_aEvolution, games, and economic behaviour
260			_aNew York : _bOxford, _c1996
300			_a209 p.
505	8	0	_tIntroduction: what is an evolutionary model _tWhy evolutionary models? _tThe plan of what follows _tStatic analysis _tTheoretical framework _tBasic model _tAlternative scenarios: "playing the fiels" or "pairwise contests" _tEvolutionarily stable strategy _tGeneral definition _tAlternative interpretations of ESS: monomorphic vs. polymorphic opulations _tExamples _tPairwise contestt: the hawk-dove game _tPlaying the field: the sex-ratio game _tESS and refinements of nash equilibrium _tThe existence of an ESS _tAsymetric contests _tIntroduction _tEx ante symmetry with ex post asymmetries _tExample: the hawk-dove game revisited _tExtensive-form contests _tESS and finite populations _tThe "spite" of an ESS _tAn example of oligopolistic competition _tEvolution and cheap talk _tBasic dynamic analysis _tIntroduction _tThe replicator dynamics _tThe discrete-time case _tThe continuous-time case _tProperties of the replicator dynamics _tThe ESS and the replicator dynamics _tThe implicit dynamics of a monomorphic ESS _tESS conditions and polymorphic stability _tEvolutionary dynamics and nash refinemts _tSome examples _tThe hawk-dove game revisited _tThe rock-scissors-paper game _tRelicator dynamics in mixed strategies _tThe model _tESS conditions and dynamic evolutionary stability _tPermanence and survival _tDefinitions _tNecessary conditions for persistence and permanence _tSufficient conditions for permanence _tAverage behaviour in permanent systems _tPopulation genetics _tThe prisoner's dilemma _tBasic (unperturbed) model _tNoisy dynamics _tPollination and reward: an example _tPreliminaries _tThe model _tEvolution in social environments _tIntroduction _tTheoretical framework _tEvolutionary growth dynamics _tThe model _tMonotonicity properties _tSome examples _tDynamics of monotomic evolutionary systems _tDynamic stability and nash equilibrium _tSet stability _tLong-run regularities _tEvolution and pay-off dominance _tEvolution, iterative dominance, and rationalizability _tGeneral evolutionary processes _tGradient monotonicity _tDynamic stability and rationality _tExamples _tTrading complementarities _tRisky trading _tA simplified ultimatum game _tA hierarchic model of cultural evolution _tStochastic evolution _tIntroduction _tA simple example _tTheoretical framework _tAnalysis _tLarge matching noise _tSmall matching noise _tOn the role of noise in evolutionary models _tExtensions _tContinuous-time dynamics _tRate of convergence and interaction pattern _tGlobal interaction _tLocal interaction _tThe evolution of walrasian behaviour _tEvolution, expectations, and drift _tIntroduction _tGeneral theoretical framework _tStatic expectations _tSimultaneous contexts _tCo-ordination games _tA simple model of bargaining _tMulti-stage contexts _tIntroduction _tForward induction and efficient co-ordination _tDynamic expectations _tIntroduction _tAdmissible updating rules _tEquilibrium volatility _tOn the evolution of sophistication _tIntroduction _tThe model _tNarrow sophistication range _tWide sophistication range _tDiscussion _tAfterword _tAppendix _tLiapunov's theorem _tLiouville's theorem _tA characterization of negative-definiteness _tInvariant distribution: graph characterization
650		4	_aTeoria Econômica _911924
650		4	_aRacionalização _912040
650		4	_aTeoria dos Jogos _913207
942			_cG
998			_a20001020 _bMaria _cMaria do Carmo
998			_a20160809 _b1006^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c1561 _d1561
041			_aeng