000 01718naa a2200265uu 4500
001 6042415175621
003 OSt
005 20220217145950.0
008 060424s2006 bl ||||gr |0|| 0 por d
100 1 _aAMORIM NETO, Octavio
_9350
245 1 0 _aA conexão presidencial :
_bfacções pró e antigoverno e disciplina partidária no Brasil
260 _aRio de Janeiro :
_bIUPERJ,
_c2001
520 3 _aThe article provides an explanation for the enormous variation in party discipline during the Brazilian democratic experience from 1946 to 1964. The argument is that party discipline is a function of the Presidents’ strategies in forging coalitions in Congress. One of the main consequences of such strategies was the creation of two factions within parties, one for and the other against the President. The premise is that the size of each faction affects its level of discipline. According to an econometric analysis of 982 roll-call votes, crucial determinants of discipline in the larger parties were the amount of budget resources allocated to them by the President and the time remaining in the President’s term.
650 4 _aBrazil
_912644
650 4 _aParty discipline
_925270
650 4 _aPatronage
_912649
650 4 _aFactions as defined by position vis-à-vis the President
_925271
650 4 _aPresidents of the Republic
_925272
700 1 _914036
_aSantos, Fabiano
773 0 8 _tDados - Revista de Ciências Sociais
_g44, 2, p. 291-322
_dRio de Janeiro : IUPERJ, 2001
_xISSN 0011-5258
_w
856 4 2 _uhttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582001000200003&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt
_yAcesso
942 _cS
998 _a20060424
_b1517^b
_cNatália
998 _a20080825
_b1023^b
_cZailton
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c15845
_d15845
041 _apor