000			03879nam a2200253uu 4500
001			1553
003			OSt
005			20191016062526.0
008			001023s1995 xx ||||g| |0|| 0 eng d
090			_a6.05 _bE1975e
245	1	0	_aThe economics of organized crime
260			_aCambridge : _bCambridge University, _c1995
300			_a301 p.
505	8	0	_t1 - Introduction _t1 - Overview _t2 - Alternative views on the nature of organised crime _t3 - Theories of the state and criminal organisations _t4 - The activities of organised crime _t5 - Problems in normative analysis _t6 - Alternative deterrence policies _t7 - Conclusions _tPart I - Theories of the state and the origin of criminal organisations _t2 - Organised crime, mafia and governments _t1 - Introduction _t2 - Why mafias develop _t3 - The american and sicilian mafias and the business firm _t4 - Transaction cost analysis and the Sicilian mafia _t5 - Public policy implications and further research _t3 - Gangs as primitive states _t1 - Introduction _t2 - Origins in anarchy _t3 - Evolution _t4 - Concluding comments _tPart II - The criminal organisation as a firm _t4 - Internal cohesion and competition among criminal organisations _t1 - Introductions _t2 - The military technology and the probability of success _t3 - Internal contracts and the dimension of the organisation: the monopsony case _t4 - Internal organisation and competition amog rival families _t5 - Conclusions _t5 - Conspiracy among the many: the mafia in legitimate industries _t1 - Introduction _t2 - The form of cartel agreements _t3 - A comparison of the Sicilian and New York mafias _t4 - Instances of mafia cartels _t5 - Conditions of emergence _t6 - Consequences _t7 - Conditions of disappearance _t8 - Prices and profits _t9 - Conclusions _tPart III - Organised crime and state intervention in the economy _t6 - Rival kleptocrats: the mafia versus the state _t1 - Introduction _t2 - Production with a monopoly state _t3 - Welfare maximisation with a monopoly state _t4 - Kleptocratic policy with a monopoly state _t5 - The mafia as an alternative provider of public services _t6 - Nash equilibrium _t7 - Disruptive effects of the mafia _t8 - Conclusions _t7 - Corruption: arm's-length relationships and markets _t1 - Introduction _t2 - Markets and government _t3 - Arm's-length relationships and cultures _t4 - On corruption _t5 - Economic consequences of corruption _t6 - Policy implications _t7 - Corruption and organised crime _t8 - Concluding remarks _tPart IV - Deterrence policies against legal firms involved in illegal activities _t8 - Auditing with 'ghosts' _t1 - Introduction _t2 - The model _t3 - Random audit _t4 - Conditioning audit probability on reportes output _t5 - Random audit versus the cut-off rule _t6 - Conclusion _t9 - The reputational penalty firms bear from commiting criminal fraud _t1 - Introduction _t2 - The theory of criminal penalties for frauds _t3 - Data and empirical method _t4 - Empirical results: stock return forecast errors _t5 - The amount of lost reputation _t6 - Comparing the expected penalty to the cost of the crime _t7 - Earnings changes around corporate fraud announcements _t8 - Aggregate wealth effects of the sentencing commission's guidelines _t9 - Conclusion _tPart V - Deterrence policies against organised crime _t10 - Regulating the organised crime sector _t1 - Introduction _t2 - Description of the setting _t3 - The model _t4 - Government commitment strategies _t5 - Conclusion _t11 - Oligopolistic competition in illegal markets _t1 - Introduction _t2 - Competition in outputs _t3 - Competition in prices _t4 - Conclusions
650		4	_aSociedade Contemporânea _912549
650		4	_aEconomia Informal _913035
650		4	_aCriminalidade _912141
650		4	_915163 _aCorrupção
700	1		_a _913827
942			_cG
998			_a20001023 _bMaria _cMaria do Carmo Raphael
998			_a20160310 _b1633^b _cAna
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c1739 _d1739
041			_aeng