000			01638naa a2200181uu 4500
001			6082815350421
003			OSt
005			20190211161150.0
008			060828s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aNANDA, Ved P. _927524
245	1	0	_aThe "good governance" concept revisited
260			_aThousand Oaks : _bSAGE, _cJanuary 2006
520	3		_aThe term "good governance" is unsettled in its meaning. Through the 1980s and 1990s, donor countries and institutions trended to make aid conditional upon reforms in the recipient country, which was found largely ineffective in encouraging real policy changes. More recently, donors, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United States, are increasingly insisting upon performance and good governance as a prerequisite for aid, a practice called "selectivity." This is a means of requiring a recipient state to demonstrate the seriousness of its commitment to economic and social reforms. There are no objective standards for determining good governance: some aspects include political stability, the rule of law, control of corruption, and accountability. High levels of poverty and weak governance are linked, making selectivity difficult to implement. For reforms to succeed, domestic support, ownership, and commitment are crucial, as are the recipient's cultural context and history.
773	0	8	_tThe Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science _g603, p. 269-283 _dThousand Oaks : SAGE, January 2006 _xISSN 00027162 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20060828 _b1535^b _cNatália
998			_a20100803 _b1053^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c19183 _d19183
041			_aeng