000			01602naa a2200313uu 4500
001			6101918091423
003			OSt
005			20190211161207.0
008			061019s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aRUTGERS,Mark R. _99314
245	1	0	_aThe morality of value - and purpose - rationality : _bthe kantian roots of Weber's foundational distinction
260			_aThousand Oaks : _bSAGE, _cSeptember 2006
520	3		_aMax Weber's distinction between purpose- and value-rationality is almost universally accepted in administrative theory. Its precise meaning is, however, unclear. In this article, more insight into the nature of Weber's distinction is claimed by approaching it from a (neo-) Kantian perspective. It is claimed that the Kantian contrast between autonomy and heteronomy of the will and the distinction between absolute and relative ends is at the heart of Weber's distinction. This implies that the distinction has paradoxical underpinnings as it is rooted in a moral context that does not fit Weber's sociological approach
650		4	_aValor Social _913435
650		4	_aMoralidade Administrativa _913082
650		4	_aAção Social _912020
650		4	_aPesquisa Social _911970
650		4	_aEvento _913145
650		4	_aCapitalismo _913045
650		4	_aComportamento humano _911992
650		4	_aÉtica _911958
650		4	_aSociologia _912776
650		4	_912662 _a Burocracia
700	1		_aSCHREURS, Petra _927778
773	0	8	_tAdministration & Society _g38, 4, p. 403-421 _dThousand Oaks : SAGE, September 2006 _xISSN 00953997 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20061019 _b1809^b _cCarolina
998			_a20100720 _b0938^b _cDaiane
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c19495 _d19495
041			_aeng