000			01636naa a2200181uu 4500
001			6121111422821
003			OSt
005			20190211161602.0
008			061211s1998 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWESTPHAL, James D _911307
245	1	0	_aBoard games : _bhow CEOs adapt to increases in structural board independence from management
260			_aIthaca : _bJohnson Graduate School of Management, _cSeptember 1998
520	3		_aThis paper presents a model that incorporates the behavior of chief executive officers (CEOs) into an explanation of how boards of directors affect organizational outcomes. Hypotheses are tested with archival data on corporate strategy, CEO compensation, board structure, and demographies, together with data from an original survey of both CEOs and outside directors from 221 large- and medium-sized US corporations. The findings indicate that (1) changes in board structure that increase the board's independence from management are associated with higher levels of CEO ingratiation and persuasion behavior toward board members, and (2) such influence behaviors, in turn, serve to offset the effect of increased structural board independence on corporate strategy and CEO compensation policy. Implications for theory and CEO research on CEO-board power and effectiveness and the larger literature on power and influence are discussed
773	0	8	_tAdministrative Science Quarterly _g43, 3, p. 511-537 _dIthaca : Johnson Graduate School of Management, September 1998 _xISSN 00018392 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20061211 _b1142^b _cNatália
998			_a20101027 _b1633^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c20552 _d20552
041			_aeng