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001			6121115215021
003			OSt
005			20190211161610.0
008			061211s1997 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWESTPHAL, James D. _911307
245	1	0	_aDefections from the inner circle : _bsocial exchange, reciprocity, and the diffusion of board independence in U.S. corporations
260			_aIthaca : _bJohnson Graduate School of Management, _cMarch 1997
520	3		_aThis study seeks to reconcile traditional sociological views of the corporate board as an instrument of elite cohesion with recent evidence of greater board activism and control over top management. We propose that CEO-directors may typically support fellow CEOs by impeding increased board control over management but that CEO-directors may also foster this change if they have experienced it in their own corporation. Drawing on social exchange theory, we develop and text the argument that these CEO-directors may experience a reversal in the basis for generalized social exchange with other top managers from one of deference and support to one of independence and control. Using data from a large sample of major US corporations over a recent ten-year period, we show (1) how CEO-directors "defect" from the network of mutually supportive corporate leaders, (2) how defections have diffused across organizations and over time, and (3) how this has contributed to increased board control, as measured by changes in board struture, diversification strategy, and contingent compensation. We also provide evidence that a social exchange perspective can explain the diffusion of these changes better than more conventional perspectives on network diffusion that emphasize imitation or learning
700	1		_aZAJAC, Edward J _916686
773	0	8	_tAdministrative Science Quarterly _g42, 1, p. 161-183 _dIthaca : Johnson Graduate School of Management, March 1997 _xISSN 00018392 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20061211 _b1521^b _cNatália
998			_a20101108 _b1545^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c20569 _d20569
041			_aeng