000			01741naa a2200193uu 4500
001			6121317181121
003			OSt
005			20190211161650.0
008			061213s1996 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aZAJAC, Edward J. _916686
245	1	0	_aDirector reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks
260			_aIthaca : _bJohnson Graduate School of Management, _cSeptember 1996
520	3		_aThis study advances research on CEO-based relationships, interlocking directorates, and directors reputation by examining how contests for intraorganizational power can affect interorganizational ties. We propose that powerful top managers seek to maintain their control by selecting and retaining board members with experience on other, passive boards and excluding individuals with experience on more active boards. We also propose that powerful boards similarly seek to maintain their control by favoring directors with a reputation for more actively monitoring management and avoiding directors with experience on passive boards. Hypotheses are tested longitudinally using CEO-board data taken from 491 of the largest US corporations over a recent seven-year period. The findings suggest that variation in CEO-board power relationship across organizations has contributed to a segmentation of the corporate director network. We discuss how our on whether increased board control has diffused across large US corporations
700	1		_aWESTPHAL, James D _911307
773	0	8	_tAdministrative Science Quarterly _g41, 3, p. 507-529 _dIthaca : Johnson Graduate School of Management, September 1996 _xISSN 00018392 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20061213 _b1718^b _cNatália
998			_a20101108 _b1554^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c20647 _d20647
041			_aeng