000			01886naa a2200205uu 4500
001			6122114575021
003			OSt
005			20190211161916.0
008			061221s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBAUMGARTNER, Frank R. _9922
245	1	0	_aPunctuated equilibrium in French budgeting processes
260			_aNew York, NY : _bRoutledge, _cSetembro 2006
520	3		_aWe use data on French budgeting to test models of friction, incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium. Data include the overall state budget since 1820; ministerial budgets for seven ministries since 1868; and a more complete ministerial series covering ten ministries since 1947. Our results in every case are remarkably similar to the highly leptokurtic distributions that Jones and Baumgartner (2005) demonstrated in US budgeting processes. This suggests that general characteristics of administrative processes create friction, and that these general factors are more important than particular details of organizational design. The legendary centralization and administrative strength of the French state, especially when compared to the decentralized separated powers structure of the US system, where the theory was developed, is apparently not sufficient to overcome cognitive pressures causing friction. Further, our French data cover a wide range of institutional procedures and constitutional regimes. The similarity of our findings across all these settings suggests that administrative structures alone are less important than the cognitive reasons discussed in the original model.
700	1		_aFOUCAULT, Martial _929388
700	1		_929389 _aFrançois, Abel
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g13, 7, p. 1086 - 1103 _dNew York, NY : Routledge, Setembro 2006 _xISSN 1466-4429 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20061221 _b1457^b _cNatália
998			_a20100616 _b1516^b _cceleste
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c20981 _d20981
041			_aeng