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003 OSt
005 20190211161921.0
008 061221s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100 1 _aMCLEAN, Iain
_929403
245 1 0 _aWhy Should We Be Beggars with the Ballot in Our Hand? Veto Players and the Failure of Land Value Taxation in the United Kingdom, 1909–14
260 _aNew York, NY :
_bCambridge University Press,
_cOctober 2006
520 3 _aRecent veto player work argues that majoritarian regimes such as the United Kingdom have better fiscal discipline and smaller welfare states than proportional regimes with more veto players. An analytic narrative of the failure of land value taxation in the United Kingdom between 1909 and 1914 shows, however, that it failed not because of previously advanced reasons, but because the number of veto players in British politics was sharply increased. This increase in veto player numbers prevented a tax increase. All seven of the conventional reasons for characterizing the United Kingdom as a low-n veto player regime failed to hold between 1906 and 1914. Observable implications discussed include the need to review the entire history of British politics in this period in the light of the temporary increase in veto players; and the ambiguous implications of number of veto players for fiscal discipline.
700 1 _aNOU, Jennifer
_929404
773 0 8 _tBritish Journal of Political Science
_g36, 4, p. 575-591
_dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, October 2006
_xISSN 0007-1234
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20061221
_b1547^b
_cNatália
998 _a20081031
_b1103^b
_cZailton
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c20994
_d20994
041 _aeng