000			02619naa a2200193uu 4500
001			6122116020421
003			OSt
005			20190211161922.0
008			061221s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aNETO, Octavio Amorim _929407
245	1	0	_aBreaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation : _bPresidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cOctober 2006
520	3		_aEurope has over the past century experienced an impressive increase in the number of presidential heads of state. Many of the new democracies since the mid-1970s are semi-presidential regimes that combine a popularly elected president with the traditional features of parliamentary democracy. At the same time, the frequency of the appointment of non-partisan cabinet members has risen. Cabinet appointments are the most important personnel decisions in parliamentary systems, and traditionally such appointments have been virtually monopolized by the governing political parties. Under semi-presidentialism, however, cabinet appointments may instead become a tug-of-war between a prime minister and a president with different partisan preferences. In this article the relationship between presidential power and the incidence of non-partisan cabinet appointments is examined and a game-theoretic model of cabinet appointments in parliamentary systems with a strong president is developed. In this model the prime minister has proposal power over cabinet appointments and the president an ex post veto. This model yields three comparative statics predictions concerning non-partisan cabinet appointments. The incidence of such appointments should covary positively with the president's powers and negatively with the prime minister's electoral prospects. The likelihood of such appointments should also correlate in a non-intuitive way with the value that the president and the prime minister attach to non-partisan appointees. Based on these results, eight operational hypotheses are developed, which are tested against a sample of 134 European cabinets representing twelve semi-presidential and twelve purely parliamentary regimes in the 1990s. Significant empirical support is found for all three comparative statics results and for most of the specific hypotheses.
700	1		_aSTRØM, Kaare _910409
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g36, 4, p. 619-643 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, October 2006 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20061221 _b1602^b _cNatália
998			_a20081031 _b1104^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c20996 _d20996
041			_aeng