000			01850naa a2200193uu 4500
001			6122116083821
003			OSt
005			20190211161922.0
008			061221s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aLANGLOIS, Catherine C. _929408
245	1	0	_aWhen Fully Informed States Make Good the Threat of War : _bRational Escalation and the Failure of Bargaining
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cOctober 2006
520	3		_aWhy would fully informed, rational actors fight over possession of a valued asset when they could negotiate a settlement in peace? Our explanation of the decision to fight highlights the incentives that are present when the defender holds a valued asset coveted by the challenger. The defender receives utility from possession of the contested asset and sees any compromise as a loss that is lower if postponed. The challenger, instead, sees any compromise as a gain that is more valuable if reached earlier. Faced with the defender's vested interest in the status quo, the challenger needs to threaten war and may have no choice but to implement the threat to force a settlement. For the defender, the threat of war is a deterrent that might incite the challenger to back down. In the perfect equilibria that we describe, the players' ability to threaten each other credibly allows them to maintain incompatible bargaining positions instead of helping them narrow their differences. But the very credibility of these threats leads our rivals to engage in what can become lengthy protracted wars.
700	1		_aLANGLOIS, Jean-Pierre P. _929409
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g36, 4, p. 645-669 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, October 2006 _xISSN 0007-1234 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20061221 _b1608^b _cNatália
998			_a20081031 _b1104^b _cZailton
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c20997 _d20997
041			_aeng