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008			061226s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aELMAN, Colin _929437
245	1	0	_aExtending Offensive Realism : _bThe Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional Hegemony
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2004
520	3		_aJohn Mearsheimer suggests that, whenever possible, great powers are constrained to seek regional hegemony, the safest feasible situation for a state. This objective is hard to achieve because other great powers want to block the attempt, but it is doable because buck-passing and other hurdles make balancing inefficient. Contra Mearsheimer, I argue that it is the absence of balancers, not balancing inefficiencies, that best explains when states can hope to dominate their neighborhoods. Regional hegemony is only achievable when it is easy. I use property space techniques to develop an extended version of offensive realism that clarifies why states will sometimes prefer not to block a hegemonic bid. In particular, I argue that local considerations will often prevent a continental great power from responding to a rising state in another region. I test my argument by process tracing the U.S. purchase of Louisiana and show that France's decision to sell is best explained by its pursuit of its own territorial ambitions. My extended version of offensive realism suggests that its single success story of the last 200 years, U.S. dominance of North America, provides no encouragement to contemporary states contemplating a bid for regional hegemony.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g98, 4, p. 563-576 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, November 2004 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20061226 _b1617^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21020 _d21020
041			_aeng