000			01395naa a2200169uu 4500
001			6122616264121
003			OSt
005			20190211161935.0
008			061226s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSTONE, Randall W. _929438
245	1	0	_aThe Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2004
520	3		_aWhy has IMF lending achieved such poor results in Africa? Is it because the Fund imposes the wrong conditions, or because it fails to enforce them? Analysis of monthly data on 53 African countries from 1990 to 2000 shows that the IMF's loans-for-reform contract lacks credibility because donor countries intervene to prevent rigorous enforcement. Countries that have influence with developed-country patrons—as measured by U.S. foreign aid, membership in postcolonial international institutions, and voting profiles in the UN—are subject to less rigorous enforcement (shorter program suspensions). They have more frequent program suspensions, because they violate their conditions more often. The IMF will have to become more independent in order to become an effective champion of reform.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g98, 4, p. 577-591 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, November 2004 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20061226 _b1626^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21021 _d21021
041			_aeng