000			01790naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7010211192721
003			OSt
005			20190211161945.0
008			070102s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDRUCKMAN, James N _917960
245	1	0	_aPolitical Preference Formation : _bCompetition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cNovember 2004
520	3		_aOne of the most contested questions in the social sciences is whether people behave rationally. A large body of work assumes that individuals do in fact make rational economic, political, and social decisions. Yet hundreds of experiments suggest that this is not the case. Framing effects constitute one of the most stunning and influential demonstrations of irrationality. The effects not only challenge the foundational assumptions of much of the social sciences (e.g., the existence of coherent preferences or stable attitudes), but also lead many scholars to adopt alternative approaches (e.g., prospect theory). Surprisingly, virtually no work has sought to specify the political conditions under which framing effects occur. I fill this gap by offering a theory and experimental test. I show how contextual forces (e.g., elite competition, deliberation) and individual attributes (e.g., expertise) affect the success of framing. The results provide insight into when rationality assumptions apply and, also, have broad implications for political psychology and experimental methods.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g98, 4, p. 671-686 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, November 2004 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070102 _b1119^b _cNatália
998			_a20070105 _b1736^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21074 _d21074
041			_aeng