000			01753naa a2200217uu 4500
001			7010216184721
003			OSt
005			20220608172202.0
008			070102s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMESQUITA, Bruce Bueno de _97148
245	1	0	_aAn Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cDecember 1999
520	3		_aWe examine formally the link between domestic political institutions and policy choices in the context of eight empirical regularities that constitute the democratic peace. We demonstrate that democratic leaders, when faced with war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war effort than are autocrats. This follows because the survival of political leaders with larger winning coalitions hinges on successful policy. The extra effort made by democrats provides a military advantage over autocrats. This makes democrats unattractive targets since their institutional constraints cause them to mobilize resources for the war effort. In addition to trying harder, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Because defeat is more likely to lead to domestic replacement for democrats than for autocrats, democrats only initiate wars they expect to win. These two factors lead to the interaction between polities that is often referred to as the democratic peace.
700	1		_919697 _aMorrow, James D.
700	1		_929584 _aSiverson, Randolph M.
700	1		_921985 _aSmith, Alastair
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g93, 3, p. 791-808 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1999 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070102 _b1618^b _cNatália
998			_a20070105 _b1735^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21119 _d21119
041			_aeng