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003			OSt
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008			070102s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBINDER, Sarah A _929591
245	1	0	_aThe Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cSeptember 1999
520	3		_aDavid Mayhew's Divided We Govern (1991) sparked an industry of scholars who alternately challenge or confirm the work on theoretical and empirical grounds. Still, we lack a definitive account of the proportions and causes of legislative gridlock. I revisit the effects of elections and institutions on policy outcomes to propose an alternative theory of gridlock: The distribution of policy preferences within the parties, between the two chambers, and across Congress more broadly is central to explaining the dynamics of gridlock. To test the model, I construct a measure that assesses legislative output in proportion to the policy agenda. Using newspaper editorials to identify every salient legislative issue between 1947 and 1996, I generate Congress-by-Congress gridlock scores and use them to test competing explanations. The results suggest that intrabranch conflict--perhaps more than interbranch rivalry--is critical in shaping deadlock in American politics.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g93, 3, p. 519-534 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, September 1999 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070102 _b1806^b _cNatália
998			_a20070105 _b1737^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21126 _d21126
041			_aeng