000			01539naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7010315402821
003			OSt
005			20190211162022.0
008			070103s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWILKERSON, John D _929606
245	1	0	_a"Killer" Amendments in Congress
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cSeptember 1999
520	3		_aFor more than three decades, social choice theorists and legislative scholars have studied how legislative outcomes in Congress can be manipulated through strategic amendments and voting. I address the central limitation of this research, a virtual absence of systematic empirical work, by examining 76 "killer" amendments considered during the 103d and 104th congresses. I trace the effects of these amendments on their related bills using archival sources, test for strategic voting using NOMINATE as the baseline measure of legislator preferences across a range of issues, and explore with OLS regression why some killer amendments are more strategically important than others. The findings indicate that successful killer amendments and identifiable strategic voting are extremely rare. In none of the cases examined could the defeat of a bill be attributed to adoption of an alleged killer amendment.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g93, 3, p. 535-552 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, September 1999 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070103 _b1540^b _cNatália
998			_a20070105 _b1727^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21149 _d21149
041			_aeng