000			01637naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7010315515621
003			OSt
005			20190211162025.0
008			070103s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBOIX, Carles _929612
245	1	0	_aSetting the Rules of the Game : _bThe Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cSeptember 1999
520	3		_aLooking at the history of democracies in the developed world, I show that electoral systems derive from the decisions the ruling parties make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. As long as the electoral arena does not change and the current electoral regime benefits the ruling parties, the electoral system is not altered. As the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in voters' preferences), the ruling parties modify the electoral system, depending on the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old parties. When the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority to proportional representation if no old party enjoys a dominant position, but they do not do this if there is a dominant old party. When new entrants are weak a system of nonproportional representation is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g93, 3, p. 609-624 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, September 1999 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070103 _b1551^b _cNatália
998			_a20070105 _b1726^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21156 _d21156
041			_aeng