000			01785naa a2200205uu 4500
001			7010412593721
003			OSt
005			20190211162045.0
008			070104s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aLOWRY, Robert C. _929651
245	1	0	_aFiscal policy outcomes and electoral accountability in American states
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cDecember 1998
520	3		_aClear fiscal policy effects appear in American state gubernatorial and legislative elections between 1968 and 1992, independent of the effects of incumbency, coattails, term limits, and macroeconomic conditions. The results show that accountability is generally stronger following a period of unified party control than under divided government. Voter reactions to taxes and spending relative to the state economy are conditional on expectations, which differ for each party. Net of these expectations, Republican gubernatorial candidates lose votes if their party is responsible for unanticipated increases in the size of the state budget; Democrats do not and, indeed, may be rewarded for small increases. Independent of this, the incumbent governor's party is punished in legislative elections for failing to maintain fiscal balance. Taken together, these results show how electoral accountability for fiscal policy outcomes is strong but highly contingent on a complex configuration of party labels, partisan control, expectations and institutions.
700	1		_aALT, James E. _929652
700	1		_aFERREE, Karen E _929653
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g92, 4, p. 759-774 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1998 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070104 _b1259^b _cNatália
998			_a20070105 _b1724^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21198 _d21198
041			_aeng