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001			7010413063921
003			OSt
005			20190211162045.0
008			070104s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aHOJNACKI, Marie _929654
245	1	0	_aOrganized interests and the decision of whom to lobby in Congress
260			_aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _cDecember 1998
520	3		_aIn a departure from previous research, we focus on the dyadic relationship between lobbyists and committee members in the House of Representatives in order to test hypotheses about what factors shape the decisions of individual groups to lobby individual committee members. Our primary assumption is that organized interests seek to expand their supportive coalitions and affect the content and fate of bills referred to committees. In order to accomplish these goals, they give highest priority to lobbying their legislative allies in committee; allies may lobby other members of Congress on a group's behalf and shape legislation to conform with a group's preferences. But organizations with access to a strong resource base can move beyond their allies and work directly to expand support among undecided committee members and legislative opponents. Our empirical analysis provides evidence to support our expectations.
700	1		_aKIMBALL, David C _929655
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g92, 4, p. 775-790 _dNew York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1998 _xISSN 0003-0554 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20070104 _b1306^b _cNatália
998			_a20070105 _b1724^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c21199 _d21199
041			_aeng